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CASE NOTE
CALIFORNIA RESTORES ADDITUR:
JEHL V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO.
(CAL. 1967)
INTRODUCTION

Additur refers to the power of a court to grant a new trial conditionally where the award of damages was inadequate, i.e., granting
it unless the defendant consents to an increase of damages to a specific amount within a prescribed time.' Closely analogous to additur
is the practice of remittitur in which defendant's motion for a new
trial on the grounds of excessive damages will be denied if plaintiff
2
waives the part of the award considered excessive by the court.
In 1952, the California Supreme Court held in Dorsey v.

Barba,' that addi-tur would deny a plaintiff's right to a jury trial on
a factual issue (amount of damages), and was therefore in violation
of the state constitution.4

Recently, the California Supreme Court, in lehl v. Southern Pacific Co.,5 expressly overruled the Dorsey decision in a unanimous
opinion. Jehl held that additur does not impair the right to a jury trial
and is a proper procedure suited to efficient administration of justice.
The purpose of this note is to examine the lehl decision, its background, rationale and possible consequences.
BACKGROUND

The practice of remittitur has long been regarded as an estab6
lished part of California law. Prior to 1952, the existence of the
judge's power to grant conditional additur was assumed' but never
firmly established.'
1 See generally Bender, Additur-The Power of the Trial Court to Deny a New
Trial on the Condition that Damages Be Increased, 3 CAL. WESTERN L. REv. 1 (1966).
2 See generally Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. Rav. 1 (1942).
8 38 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952).
4 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 provides: "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to
all, and remain inviolate.. .. "
5 66 A.C. 853, 427 P.2d 988, 59 Cal. Rptr. 276 (1967).
6 See, e.g., Davis v. Southern Pacific Co., 98 Cal. 13, 32 P. 646 (1893) ; George v.
Law, 1 Cal. 363 (1851).
7 See, e.g., Blackmore v. Brennan, 43 Cal. App. 2d 280, 110 P.2d 723 (1941);
Secreto v. Carlander, 35 Cal. App. 2d 361, 95 P.2d 476 (1939).
8 Taylor v. Pole, 16 Cal. 2d 668, 107 P.2d 614 (1940).
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A. Dorsey v. Barba
The first time the question of additur was squarely presented before the California Supreme Court was in Dorsey v. BarbaY Plaintiff
sought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The jury returned verdicts against defendant and
judgment was entered accordingly. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial
on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict"
was denied on the condition that defendant consent to an increase of
the amount of damages in a sum determined by the court. Defendant
consented and plaintiff appealed from the modified judgment. On appeal the California Supreme Court held that, in a case involving unliquidated damages, the denial of a new trial on condition of defendant's consenting to an increase of the amount of an inadequate
award abridged plaintiff's right to a trial by jury."
In reaching its conclusion the court reasoned that final determination of a fact by a jury was necessary to protect the constitutional
right of a jury trial, and that, even though plaintiff was benefited by
the action of the trial court, he could actually be prejudiced, since
there remained the possibility that a second jury might have given
him a larger award than the modified judgment. 2
Dorsey drew support for its position from the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Dimick v. Schiedt,2 which held
that additur, since it was not part of the common law, deprived the
plaintiff of his right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the seventh
amendment.' 4 The reasoning in Dimick was approved in Dorsey
even though the seventh amendment of the United States Constitution is not binding upon the states.'
The Dorsey court admitted that "there may be no real distinction between the powers to increase and decrease an award of damages,"' 6 but, the court concluded that remittitur was too firmly entrenched in the law to be questioned.
9 38 Cal. 2d 350, 240 P.2d 604 (1952).
10 Prior to 1967, inadequacy of damages awarded by the jury was not an explicit
ground for granting a new trial. Thus, "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict" was the specific ground relied upon in such situations. See p. 125 infra.
11
12
18
14

38 Cal. 2d at 358, 240 P.2d at 609.

Id. at 358, 240 P.2d at 608.
293 U.S. 474 (1935).
U.S. CONST. amend. VII provides that: "In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law."
15 See, e.g., Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294 (1877); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92
U.S. 90 (1875).
16 38 Cal. 2d at 359, 240 P.2d at 609.
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Dissent as to the issue of additur in Dorsey was registered by
Justice Traynor, now Chief Justice. He contended that there was a
logical similarity between additur and remittitur, saying, "to hold remittitur constitutional and additur unconstitutional is not only illogical-it is unfair.... I doubt whether such a procedure accords
a defendant the equal protection of the laws."' 7
B. Additur Subsequent to Dorsey
The Dorsey decision did not preclude additur where both parties
consented to a suggested increase in the amount of the verdict."8
Where the plaintiff consented to additur, his consent operated as a
waiver of his right to jury trial; his refusal to consent resulted in his
obtaining a retrial of the case.
In Morgan v. Southern Pacific Co.,'9 the trial court's use of additur with only defendant's consent was sustained by distinguishing the
Dorsey case. The court noted that in Dorsey it was clear from the record that the jury award lacked support in the evidence and therefore,
a new trial should have been granted,2" whereas in the Morgan case,
the court could not determine whether plaintiff was injured or aggrieved by the increase in the verdict since the only record the plaintiff-appellant furnished was a clerk's transcript.2 Therefore, since
there was no finding that the verdict was inadequate and lacked support in the evidence, the judgment was affirmed.
In 1967, the California Legislature explicitly established inadequate damages as a ground for new trial.22 Prior to this addition, the
ground of "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict" was
the only ground available for granting a new trial where damages
were inadequate.
The 1967 legislative session also approved of additur in civil actions where the jury's verdict on damages was supported by substantial evidence but an order granting a new trial limited to the issue of
damages was nevertheless proper.2" The legislature in adopting this
procedural provision sought to limit the adherence to the rule in Dorsey to only those cases where the jury award lacked support in the evidence. This legislative distinguishing of the Dorsey case was rather
Id. at 368, 240 P.2d at 614-15.
18 See Mullin v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 206 Cal. App. 2d 23, 23 Cal. Rptr.
410 (1962); Hall v. Murphy, 187 Cal. App. 2d 296, 9 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1960).
19 173 Cal. App. 2d 282, 343 P.2d 330 (1959).
20 Id. at 284, 343 P.2d at 332.
17

21

Id.

22 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 657 (Deering 1 Advance Leg. Serv. 1967).
23 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 662.5 (Deering 1 Advance Leg. Serv. 1967).
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short-lived, since the Jehl decision ended any need to circumvent the
Dorsey holding.
JEHL

In the Jehl case, plaintiff, a 19 year old railroad worker, sued under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act for personal injuries sustained in an on-the-job accident. Due to a coupling
malfunction plaintiff was thrown from the railroad car he was riding
and fell under the wheels of a moving car. Plaintiff's right leg was
amputated below the knee and, at the time of appeal, the left leg remained in jeopardy because osteomyelitis developed in it. Hospitalized for 16 months, plaintiff underwent 18 operations and still may
require recurrent treatment. His projected earnings from the date of
the accident to age 65 would have exceeded $500,000 and the projected costs of his prosthetic appliances exceeded $15,000. Plaintiff
successfully moved for a new trial on the issue of damages on the
ground that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict in
that the damages awarded were inadequate. One of the defendant's
contentions on appeal was that the trial court should have given defendant the option to consent to additur before granting plaintiff's
motion for a new trial.
The district court of appeal held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in granting a new trial and found no reason to disturb the Dorsey case holding that additur abridged plaintiff's right to
trial by jury.
In hearing the appeal, the Supreme Court of California considered the main issue to be whether the Dorsey decision should be overruled. Chief Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court, answered in the affirmative.
The decision viewed additur as a means of efficiently and expediently administering justice without impairing the right to a jury trial.
The court noted that the California constitutional guarantee of a jury
trial operates at the time of trial, requires certain issues to be submitted to the jury and prohibits improper interference with the jury's decision once the verdict is returned.2 4 Using an historical analysis the
court reasoned that the right to a jury trial was regarded as a protection to parties relying upon a verdict.2 5 This last statement of the
court suggests indirectly that the constitutional protection of a jury
trial did not extend to parties attacking a verdict. This point was
24 66 A.C. at 861, 427 P.2d at 993, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
25 Id. at 862, 427 P.2d at 994, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
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raised in Chief Justice Traynor's dissenting opinion in the Dorsey
case.

26

Stressing the need for problems of efficient administration of justice to be viewed in proper context, the court refused to be bound by
exacting rules formulated over 150 years ago. To refute the argument that the framers of the constitution regarded the jury as the
only competent finder of fact, the Jehl decision pointed to the acceptance of court involvement in factual determinations in admitting or
excluding evidence, factual determinations regarding jurisdiction and
other judicial fact finding practiced in equity, admiralty, probate, divorce, bankruptcy and administrative proceedings.'
The decisional guidelines in Jehl for determining the amount of
an additur appear to be quite simple. If the court orders an additur, it
should set the amount it determines from the evidence to be fair and
reasonable, exercising its completely independent judgment. No formula for fixing a minimum and/or maximum amount that would be
supported by the evidence is required. If the defendant objects that
the increased amount is excessive, he may reject it and seek to sustain
the jury's award on an appeal from the new trial order. Plaintiff, if he
28
deems the amount insufficient, may appeal the modified judgment.
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The court in Jehl sought to add symmetry to the law by approving additur. The reasoning of the court was that since defendants
have been required for over 100 years in California to submit to remittitur, they should also have the advantages of its "fraternal twin,"
additur.2 9 In other words, since judges have the power to subtract,
they should also be given the power to add. A review of the dubious
rationalizations used to support remittitur subjects this argument to
criticism.
In Dimick, the United States Supreme Court noted that the historical validity of remittitur was obscure and concluded that "if the
question of remittitur were now before us for the first time, it would
be decided otherwise. 30° The California Supreme Court in Dorsey
pointed out that remittitur seemed to develop through a misconception of common law procedure, but the court concluded that the
power of remittitur was too firmly entrenched to be questioned."' In26 38 Cal. 2d at 363, 240 P.2d at 612.
27 66 A.C. at 862, 427 P.2d at 994, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
28 Id. at 864, 427 P.2d at 995, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 283.

29 Id. at 863, 427 P.2d at 995, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
80 293 U.S. 474, 484 (1935).

31 38 Cal. 2d at 359, 240 P.2d at 609.
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deed, the first federal decision recognizing the power of remittitur,
Blunt v. Little, 2 cited no authorities supporting this assumption of
power. It is also interesting to note that in 1905, the House of Lords
in England, the birthplace of remittitur, held that courts did not have
the power to conditionally alter the amount of the verdict with an additur or remittitur without the consent of both litigants. 3 It appears,
therefore, that remittitur has been recognized and upheld in California and other jurisdictions merely because it has become so deeply
entrenched in the law that the courts have been unwilling to disturb
it. In view of this tenuous argument for remittitur, it does not necessarily follow that because courts have this power, they should also
have the power of additur8 4 While symmetry in the law may have
been achieved by approving additur, it is submitted that a more logical symmetry might have been achieved by repudiating remittitur.35
Now that trial judges have the power of both additur and remittitur, there is raised the possibility of a trial court exerting a coercive
power that could result in serious atrophy of the right to trial by
jury. In actions for unliquidated damages it frequently happens that
the question of settlement is discussed between counsel and the trial
judge. With both the power of additur and remittitur, the judge's suggestions to facilitate settlement could take on a more powerful meaning, particularly since he now has the power to bring about a final
determination in accordance with the court's own view concerning
damages. Under these circumstances, counsel would be faced with a
choice that, at best, could be termed illusory.
It is only natural and probable to expect that judges will make
effective use of all the powers which are entrusted to them. Use of the
power of additur and remittitur in this manner would result in an expeditious disposition of cases. The more success achieved by such a
"technique," the more frequently it would be used. This seems particularly true in light of the constant importuning made to trial
judges to speed up their work. Nonetheless it is obvious that such a
use of additur and remittitur would prejudice the rights of the litigants, in particular, and would, in general, attenuate the right to a
jury trial. Such forced settlements cannot be tolerated. In Rosenberg
v. Vosper, 6 this point was clearly made when the court reasoned that,
"Although efforts on the part of a trial judge to expedite proceedings
82 3 F. Cas. 760 (No. 1578)

(C.C. Mass. 1822).

33 Watt v. Watt [1905] A.C. 115.
84 See 21 VA. L. REv. 666 (1935).
35 Cf. West v. City of San Diego, 54 Cal. 2d 469, 353 P.2d 929 (1960) wherein
the rights of husbands and wives were made "symmetrical" by denying the right of
either to sue for loss of consortium, notwithstanding the common law rule giving such
a right to the husband.
86 45 Cal. App. 2d 365, 114 P.2d 29 (1941).
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and to encourage settlements are ordinarily to be commended, such
efforts should never be so directed as to compel either litigant to make
a forced settlement." 7
When the trial judge and counsel discuss the question of settlement during the course of the trial, the dollar figures of offer and demand are often mentioned. Jehl clearly points out that the trial judge
in fixing the amount of additur is to exercise his completely independent judgment.38 If during settlement talks, the judge becomes aware
of the amount demanded and offered, it will be almost impossible for
him to make a completely independent judgment when faced with a
subsequent granting of additur. It is therefore submitted that, if trial
judges are to exercise their completely independent judgments in setting the amount of additur, they then should be precluded from participating in any settlement discussions taking place during the litigation in which dollar figures of demand and offer are mentioned. For
similar reasons of objectivity the judge in the pre-trial conference is
generally not the same judge to hear the case, unless manpower shortage prohibits such an arrangement.3 9 And even in cases of single
judge courts, "[T]he judge's participation in the settlement discussions may be intentionally curtailed-especially with respect to dollar figures of offers and demands-so that no possible doubt can be
held as to his full objectivity at the trial."4 °
The court in Jehl notes that the California constitution prohibits improper interference with the jury's decision and then proceeds to show that the rather modern practice of granting new trials
for inadequate damage awards constitutes an accepted limitation to
the former broad powers of the jury. The court concludes that additur is but a logical step in the growth of the law relating to unliquidated damages. To fortify such reasoning the court stresses the need for
expediency in administering justice. Additur is naturally looked upofi
as a means of accomplishing this goal of expediency because it reduces the number of new trials.
In light of Jehl, doubt is raised as to the meaning and significance of the California constitutional provision regarding right to
jury trial. Obviously, there must be a controlling factor for sanctioning and protecting this right in the constitution. One writer has
suggested that:
[A]s long as the law, particularly in the form of constitutional sanctions, gives to a party the right to a jury trial, it would seem that the
37

38

Id. at 371, 114 P.2d at 33.
66 A.C. at 864, 427 P.2d at 995, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 283.

39 CALIFORNIA

CONTINUING

SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES,
40 Id. at 194.

EDUCATION

193 (1963).

OF THE BAR,

CALIFORNIA

PRETRIAL AND
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right should carry with it the privilege of determining its expediency.
The only object in protecting the right with constitutional sanctions
must have been to give a litigant power to make an arbitrary choice
and prevent legislators and courts from determining any question of
expediency. Otherwise, the whole matter would have been trusted to
41
legislative and judicial regulation.

It is submitted that the California Supreme Court has indeed determined the question of expediency for the litigants. It seems obvi-

ous that the concept of trial by jury went through a great deal of judicial regulation in Jehl. Whether Jehl marks the limits of judicial
regulation of jury trials or serves as a pivotal case that may eventually lead to unliquidated damages being determined solely by the

court, remains to be seen. The latter may well be the result if expediency and efficiency control the meaning and substance of the right to
jury trial.
CONCLUSION
The Jehl case presented the California Supreme Court with the

difficult problem of deciding whether to approve the practice of additur. To reverse an earlier decision is never an easy task, particularly
when that decision was based largely on a holding of the United
States Supreme Court. Nor is it a simple decision to approve the

counterpart of a procedure that is largely supported in the law by
rather dubious rationalizations and arguments. Yet, by far the most
difficult problem confronting the court in Jehl was determining that

additur did not impair the right to trial by jury. The decision, which
mainly stresses the need for modem interpretation in this area so as
to solve practical problems of efficiency, fails to meet the question

head on. Perhaps the court's difficulty in supporting their conclusion
can best be understood if the following language is used as a framework:
If there ever was anything which needed the aid of sophistry and artificial logic, it would seem to be a demonstration that the court, when it
allows a remittitur or an additur under ordinary circumstances in a
personal injury case, does not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury. If the substitution takes place, how can it be asserted with any
semblance of realism that the jury has tried the case and the parties
42
have had a jury trial?
The decision in Jehl serves to indicate that the right to trial by
jury may not be quite so inviolate as once believed. It is certainly
true that additur will serve to expedite the present voluminous

amount of litigation. Yet, the question remains as to whether the end
41
42

Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. VA. L. Rxv. 1, 36 (1942).
Id. at 36-37.
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will justify the means. The answer to that question rests with the
trial judges, for indeed, the ultimate success or failure of additur lies
with them. If this practice is used in a coercive manner, the result
could be a serious atrophy of the right to a jury trial. If used with
proper discretion, where the trial judge exercises his completely independent judgment, it could serve as an aid in the efficient and expeditious administration of justice. However, the latter result can occur
only if the search for expediency is not permitted to interfere with or
control sound judicial discretion.
Daniel J. Kelly

